BANGLADESH: HOPING AGAINST HOPE
By Ather Rehman Khan
During 2006/2007, while visiting Dhaka, in a lighter vein, I passed a remark to a Bengali senior officer: Why don’t you take over the government in Bangladesh to put right the country? He politely replied, Bangladesh is not Punjab. Here 5 lac mob in small cities and 10 lac in Dhaka is a matter of hours. Khaleda Zia is the wife of Major Zia, who killed his own CO, Col. Janjua (5 Baluch), while in command of an EB Regiment in East Pakistan during 1971. Later, Pakistan always supported Khaleda Zia against Hasina Wajid—the enemy of the enemy.
Today, the possible departure of Sheikh Hasina’s government is far more than a domestic crisis. It is a geopolitical event that could reshape the subcontinent’s balance of power. Hasina’s firm hand brought stability to Bangladesh and ensured a close alignment with India, keeping Pakistan at bay. Her exit, however, opens the door to new uncertainties where India and Pakistan may once again clash indirectly on Bengali soil.
For India, Hasina was the ideal partner. She secured the eastern flank, denied space to anti-India elements, and deepened cooperation on trade, energy, and security. Her personal hostility to Pakistan over 1971 made her a natural ally. Without her, Delhi fears a vacuum that Pakistan—or its proxies—might exploit.
For Pakistan, turmoil in Dhaka presents opportunity. Long sidelined, Islamabad could attempt to re-engage through soft power, religious affinity, or diplomatic outreach to opposition forces. Even symbolic gestures of goodwill would complicate India’s strategic calculus and force Delhi to divert attention from other fronts.
Yet the risks are severe. Any perception of Pakistani meddling could trigger a sharp Indian reaction. Within Bangladesh, a pivot toward Pakistan would inflame old divisions between those who revere the spirit of 1971 and those who resent India’s dominance.
Bangladesh’s path now lies between two scenarios. One is continuity: a government that, while less tied to Delhi than Hasina, still preserves cooperation with India and avoids Pakistan. The other is change: a weak or fractured leadership that asserts independence by turning to China and cautiously engaging Islamabad. The first outcome secures India’s interests; the second threatens a new two-front challenge and the specter of an encirclement by a Beijing-Islamabad-Dhaka axis.
India must now broaden its approach. Reliance on one leader has proven shortsighted. To safeguard its position, Delhi must engage across the Bangladeshi spectrum and, most importantly, with the people. Only a partnership based on mutual respect and tangible benefits—not dependency—will ensure Bangladesh’s stability.
The end of Hasina’s rule could become South Asia’s newest tinderbox. The India-Pakistan rivalry may once again converge in the delta of Bengal. And Bangladesh—born of the rupture between the two in 1971—now risks becoming the epicenter of their renewed conflict. Its stability is not just its own concern, but the key to peace and security for over a billion and a half people.
